Incompatibility of Subjective and Objective Knowledge :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Incompatibility of Subjective and heading Knowledge In his book The View From Nowhere (1986), Thomas Nagel discusses the diverse problems that arise when we consider the contrast between the objective world we inhabit, and be part of, and the inherently subjective way we collect that world. Nagel writes that understanding the descent between these external and internal standpoints is central to solving these problems It is the most primeval release about morality, knowledge, freedom, the self, and the relation of mind to the tangible world (p.3). In this screen I will survey the problems that Nagel is referring to, and will echo Nagels view that this issue is of central importance within philosophy. However, I will also signify that Nagel is wrong in his emphasis in dealing with the issue. The opening manner of speaking of the book make it clear that Nagel sees ultimately only a atomic number 53 problem how to combine the perspective of a particular person at bottom the world with an objective view of that same world, the person and his viewpoint included. He then goes on to address the particular problems, each of which he sees as only an aspect of this single overall problem. Problem 1 How shadow we account for the existence of subjective experience within an objective physical universe? This problem is a modern version of the mind/ frame problem i.e. what is the relationship between the mind and the body? Are they break away entities, or are they somehow different aspects of the same thing? The interrogative was posed in Nagels 1974 essay What Is It Like to Be a flutter? and has been somewhat revitalised recently in the guise of Chalmerss hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). Nagel argues that although we may understand the way cricket bats use sonar to perceive their world, to rainfly and catch insects, we will never know what it is manage to be a bat using sonar, precisely because we are not bats. Our understanding of bat son ar can only be a physiological and operative account we will only ever have a view of bat sonar from the outside. Imagine what sonar must feel same inside, to a bat In the same way that there is something it is like for us to see the world using our eyes (i.e. colours, hue and perspicacity in our visual field), surely there must also be something it is like for bats perceiving the world through sonar.